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Maladies of the Legal Soul:
Psychoanalysis and Interpretation in Law
Peter Goodrich7

And if for him the law guarantees an increment of pleasure, and
power, it would be good to uncover what this implies about his desire he seems to get more sexual satisfactionfrom making laws than love.1
There is evidence that Freud hesitated over the possibility of studying
law before he eventually undertook a career in medicine. One might say that
the profession of law was repressed in favor of clinical science, and certainly
the theme of law and its transgression constantly returns in Freud's work and
was to become a foundational focus of the new science of psychoanalysis. 2
Although positive law was never an explicit or conscious object of Freudian
psychoanalysis, it is no exaggeration to observe that his work is structured
by conflicts between desire and law, the pleasure principle and the reality
principle, and at its most extreme, sexuality and death - eros and thanatos.3
The jurisprudential themes of authority and prohibition, of desire and transgression, litter his substantive elaborations of the workings of the human
psyche. The legalism of Freudian thought is nowhere more evident than in
his interpretations of the origins of the social order in the transgression of the
authority or law of the father. This well known myth is elaborated in the
story of Oedipus, the narrative of a son who kills his father and marries his
mother. It is also elaborated in terms of the social anthropology of Totem
and Taboo, the prehistorical story of the murder of a tribal father by jealous
sons, which leads to the genesis of law.
* Corporation of London Professor of Law, Birkbeck College, University of London.
My thanks to Aaron Schfdtz and Linda Mills for chewing over this text with me. This Article
is based on an address presented at the Washington and Lee School of Law on March 28,
1997, in connection with the Lacan and the Subject of Law Symposium.
1. LucE IRiGARAY, SPECULUM OF THE OTHER WOMAN 38-39 (1985).
2. See 1 ERNEsT JONES, THE LwF AND WORK OF SIGMUND FREUD 27 (1953). This
reference is brilliantly and amusingly interpolated in Charles Yablon, FreudasLaw Professor:
An AlternativeHistory, 16 CARDozo L. REv. 1439 (1995).
3. See SIGMUND FREuD, CwVILIZATION AND rrs DIsCoNTENTs 48-50, 65-71 (1961)
(addressing the antinomy between life and death at the level of the social).
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The conflict of desire and law, which Freud found exemplified in the
story of Oedipus, can act as a guiding thread to the study of a psychoanalytic
theory of law. Sophocles' story of King Oedipus, who was the son of Laius,
King of Thebes, was itself, according to Freud, probably a reworking of a
dream.4 Oedipus was exposed as an infant because an oracle had warned
Laius that he would be killed by his yet unborn child. The child was rescued
and grew up in an alien court. Uncertain of his own origins, he too questioned the oracle, who warned him to stay away from his home because he
was destined to murder his father and marry his mother. While intending to
travel away from his home, Oedipus encountered King Laius and in a sudden
quarrel killed him. Oedipus then went to Thebes where he solved the riddle
of the Sphinx and thereby liberated the city from plague and pestilence. The
grateful populace made him king, and he married Jocasta his mother. A
plague which the oracle reported would only end when the murderer of
Laius had been driven from the land eventually interrupted Oedipus' peaceful and honorable reign. When he discovers that he is himself the unwitting
murderer, Oedipus blinds himself and forsakes his home. The oracle has
been fulfilled.
The Interpretationof Dreams offers the fullest discussion of the myth
of Oedipus, explaining the myth as a "typical dream" in which the subject
expresses the desire to kill his father even though his father is dead.5 Freud
interprets the story of Oedipus first and most forcefully in terms of the
universal structure of a child's relation to its parents:
His destiny moves us only because it might have been ours .... While
the poet, as he unravels the past, brings to light the guilt of Oedipus, he
is at the same time compelling us to recognize our own inner minds, in
which those same impulses, though suppressed, are still to be found.6
Freud argues that the individual psyche forms as a result of the Oedipal crisis
or conflict. The myth is a story of the foundation of subjectivity through an
originary repression. The son learns to orient and limit his desire by recognizing the father's authority through his interdiction or prohibition of the
4. SIGMUND FREUD, THE INTERPRETATION OF DREAMs 297 (1971).

5. FREUD, supranote 4, at 293-94 (discussing the case of a young man who was unable
to go out into the street because he was tortured by the fear that he would kill everyone he

met). "The analysis... showed that the basis of this [obsessional neurosis] was an impulse
to murder his somewhat over-severe father." Id. at 294; see also SIGMUND FREUD, PsYCHoPATHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY LuFE 109 (1942) (analyzing the case of a physician who unwittingly
gives his ancient and ailing father a lethal injection, a mistake which Freud perceives to be
dictated in part by "unconscious hostility" to his father).
6. FREUD, supra note 4, at 296.
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son's desire for his mother. In other words, through recognition of what
Lacan terms the law of father, the subject enters the social or, for Lacan, the
symbolic: "If Freud insisted on the Oedipus complex.., it is obviously
because for him the Law is there ab origine [from the beginning]." 7 The
Oedipus complex presents the initial encounter of the subject with an absolute limit, an authority or law. The myth can thus be taken to exemplify the
subjective structure of recognition of authority and obedience to, or (neurotic) revolt against, law. In this sense, the son embodies the conflict that
everyone faces between a remorseful obedience to law and transgression of
it. At the level of the subject, the Oedipal structure is one of conflict between desire and law. It should be noted, for that reason, that it not only
banishes desire to the unconscious, but also defines law by reference to its
prohibition of desire or, more simply, to an unconscious erotic drive. To
kill your father or sleep with your mother is a consciously incomprehensible
or simply unthinkable act.
If the story of Oedipus can act as an allegory for the human relation to
authority, it can only explicitly do so by virtue of the power of psychoanalytic interpretation. Freud interprets the story as a figure or symptom of an
unconscious structure which is made available only by virtue of the interpretative techniques of psychoanalysis, specifically the hermeneutics developed
through the interpretation of dreams, "the royal road to the unconscious."
These techniques of interpretation or hermeneutics present the second legally
significant feature of the Freudian analysis of the story of Oedipus. Freud
reads the story as a series of riddles to decipher. The story is ultimately
resolved by the riddle of who had murdered Laius a long time ago:
But he, where is he? Where shall now be read
The fading record of this ancient guilt?8
The textual metaphor of psyche and history is not accidental. Psychoanalysis
provides a method of symptomatic reconstruction of biographical and historical clues. It treats the individual subject as a text to be interpreted and
reconstructed according to an unconscious biographical structure which is
manifest only in repetitions, slips, and other apparently accidental figures or
clues. Psychoanalysis then arguably provides a powerful method of analysis
of texts and of psyche and culture as texts. 9 This hermeneutics at a minimum
7. JACQUES LACAN, THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN, BOOK III: THE PSYCHOSES,

1955-56, at 83 (1993). "This fundamental law is simply a law of symbolization. This is what
the Oedipus complex means." Id.
8. FREUD, supra note 4, at 295 (citing SOPHOCLES, OEDIPUS REX (5th Cen. B.C.)).
9. See JACQUES LACAN, The Function andField of Speech andLanguage in Psychoanalysis, in C1UTS: A SELECTION 30, 34-38, 77-107 (1977) [hereinafter =CR1Ts] (elabo-
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provides an alternative technique for interpreting law. Whether analyzed in
terms of a judicial subject or author, or in terms of an institutional or cultural
subject that can be treated as if it were an author, psychoanalysis offers a
method for reading legal texts in the symptomatic terms of their latent
meanings.
The third and final feature of Freud's retelling of the story of Oedipus
also relates to the metaphor of the psyche as text and concerns the tragic or
fated nature of the narrative. The story of Oedipus is the story of an unconscious law, the narrative of a destiny or fate that determines the events of the
subject's life independently of any subjective or merely human will. Freud
reinterprets Sophocles' portrayal of the triumph of divine will over human
impotence in terms of the unconscious determination of a subject's acts. At
the heart of the human subject is a phantasm of identity, an imagination of
persona or of an institutional role. In Freudian terms, this phantasm is fated
in the sense of being initially inscribed by the institution of the family, and
it is precisely the law of family that the myth of Oedipus most dramatically
depicts. For the subject to know who he is, he must know his genealogical
place or where it is that he comes from in the social order. Only through
knowing his place - his destiny - can the subject avoid the fate of Oedipus.

Simply put, the social order is an order or law of prescribed places that the
phantasm of an identity, a place, and a role in the social inculcates in the
subject. That inculcation attaches to or places the subject in relation to a
social structure that is neither directly evident to analysis nor necessarily
conscious to the subject who "acts out" the unconscious dictates of birth and
of early experience. Psychoanalysis thus suggests that we study the legal
system not simply as an objective system of rules, but also as a symbolic
order or imaginary domain. It is through symbols and, more broadly,
through images of social place, that the subject recognizes and forms affective attachments to law. The subject of legal authority is bound to law far
more strongly by identificatory images or phantasms of a shared substance,
by interior and self-imposed limitations, than by the external dictate of
positive law.

rating an analogy between the unconscious and linguistic structure); PAUL RICOEUR, FREUD

(1970) (detailing the hermeneuSee generally PETER GOODRICH, OEDIPUS LEX: PSYCHO-

AND PHILOSOPHY: AN ESSAY ON INTERPRETATION 3-6, 59-65

tic character of psychoanalysis).

ANALYSIS, HISTORY, LAw 181-222 (1995) (discussing theme of psychoanalysis as legal
hermeneutic); LAw AND THE POSTMODERN MIND: ESSAYS ON PSYCHOANALYSIS AND JURISPRUDENCE (David Carlson & Peter Goodrich eds., 1997) (developing a psychoanalytic
jurisprudence).
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Resistance to Psychoanalysis

Psychoanalytic interpretations of law have not tended to be popular
among lawyers or within the conventional parameters of the legal
discipline. ° It is beneficial, therefore, at the outset, to acknowledge and
address the resistance or defenses that a psychoanalytic jurisprudence is
likely to encounter. Principal among these defenses is the simple argument
that psychoanalysis is irrelevant to law. Opponents will claim that psychoanalysis concerns the private and subjective realm of personal relations and
individual beliefs. With its emphasis upon dreams, sexuality, symbols, and
the unconscious, it belongs - in a sense like morality and religious belief to a domain anterior to law, a realm of subjectivity or interiority with which
secular law is not and never has been concerned. According to this argument, law governs the external acts of a conscious and responsible subject
because "the intent of a man cannot be tried, for the devil himself knows not
the intent of a man."" Although this depiction of law as an objective technology is common both within the profession and in popular perception,
claiming that legal governance is exclusively exterior and objective is historically untenable and theoretically absurd.
From the time of its discovery, psychoanalysis was something of an
heretical enterprise. It threatened the classical order of knowledge and, as
a consequence, provoked fear, denial, and ridicule from the established
disciplines and their academic watchdogs. In Freud's own analysis,
Society did not wish to hear discussion of the discovery of those relationships which psychoanalysis treated, because in many respects it did not
have an easy conscience .... Psychoanalysis reveals the weaknesses of
the [social] system ....
It argues that it is necessary to abandon the
10. See Peter Goodrich, TranslatingLegendre or, The PoeticalSermon of a Contemporary Jurist, 16 CARDOzo L. REv. 963, 963-67 (1995) (discussing one instance of resistance).
For some recent examples of the use of psychoanalysis in Anglo-American jurisprudence, see
generally Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the
Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1563 (1984); David Caudill, Freud and CriticalLegal
Studies: Contours of a Radical Socio-Legal Psychoanalysis, 66 IND. L. REV. 651 (1991);
David Caudill, Lacanand Law: Networking with the Big Other, in 1 STUDIES INPSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY 25 (1992); DAvID CAUDILL, LACAN AND THE SUBJECT OF LAw (1997); Alain

Pottage, Recreating Difference, 5 LAw & CRITIQUE 131 (1994); and DRUCILLA CORNELL,
What Takes Placein the Dark, in TRANmSFORMATONS 170 (1993). For a discussion of the use
of psychoanalysis in legal philosophy on the continent, see generally ALAIN POTTAGE, The
Paternityof Law, in POLITICs, POsTMODERNrrY AND CRrrICAL LEGAL STUDIES 147 (1994);

Anton Schfitz, Sons of Writ, Sons of Wrath: Pierre Legendre's Critique of Rational
Law-Giving, 16 CARDozo L. REv. 979 (1995); PETER GOODRICH, LANGUAGES OF LAw:

FROM LOGICs OF MEMORY TO NOMADIC MASKS 260-96 (1990).
11. Anon., Y.B. 17 Edw. 4, Pasch fol. 1, pl. 2 (1478).
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rigor of the social repression of instinct and provide a greater place for
the truth .... For having formulated these critiques psychoanalysis was

dubbed the enemy of civilization and was banished as a danger to the
public.12

Freud argued that the social imposition of morality demanded that the
individual renounce desire and repress instinct without any substantial
recompense from society. Because social institutions and academic disciplines were so badly organized and so ill equipped to deal with the subjective, irrational, or phantasmic dimensions of sociality, it was easy to deny
their existence or ridicule their presence rather than to address such aspects
of social existence directly or seriously.13
The same argument applies to law. Psychoanalysis addresses a human
subject in his or her corporeal reality as a subject driven by desire. Far from
the legal image of a rational and objective actor, psychoanalysis takes apart
the mask of reason to reveal a domain of unconscious motives, feelings, and
other irrational or more properly subjective biographical sources of action.
As Freud well predicted, it is not surprising that law as a discipline and
lawyers as a profession would not welcome the intrusion of psychoanalysis
into the domain of jurisprudence. The unconscious (what Freud termed "the
other scene") is deeply threatening both to the individual and to the institution. The unconscious harbors both the desire and the violence which the
Oedipal myth graphically illustrates. It represents that subjective force
which neither institutions nor subjects can either fully understand or control.
That which the subject does not know but feels, the unwitting dictates of
prior experience, lend an ever greater complexity to subjective acts - a
complexity which law and lawyers are neither willing nor qualified to judge.
Consequently, any attempt to draw out the common terrain of the two
disciplines or, more ambitiously, to interpret the unconscious roots of
institutional writings and other practices will yield denial, hostility, and
polemical rejection. Such resistance or charged discussions of psychoanaly12. Sigmund Freud, Risistancesa lapsychanalyse, in 2 REVUE JUlvE at 216-17 (1925).
An alternative English translation of Freud's Risistances d la psychanalyse is available in
19 SIGMUND FREUD, THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL

WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 213, 219-220 (James Strachey ed., 1981) [hereinafter THE
STANDARD EDITION]. See PIERRE LEGENDRE, L'AMOUR DU CENSEUR 17-23 (1978) (discuss-

ing text).
13. Thus Freud remarks that his contemporaries pretended that psychoanalysis was
reducible to an obsessive concern with sexuality in all aspects of existence and could thus be
dismissed as scandalous and a perversion of science. See Freud, supra note 12, at 218.
"[W]hat psycho-analysis called sexuality was by no means identical with the impulsion towards

a union of the two sexes or towards producing a pleasurable sensation in the genitals; it had
far more resemblance to the all-inclusive and all-preserving Eros of Plato's Symposium." Id.
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sis and law embody the negative expressions of the truth or, at the very least,
indicate the relevance of the psychoanalytic argument.
Freud's radical vision of psychoanalysis espoused a method that is in no
way confined
to the field of psychological disorders, but extends also to the solution of
problems in art, philosophy and religion .... The fertilizing effects of
psycho-analytic thought on these other disciplines would certainly contribute greatly towards forging a closer link, in the sense of universitasliter-

arum, between medical science and the branches
of learning which lie
14
within the sphere of philosophy and the arts.
One such art is that of jurisprudence. Hence, the study of law stands to
benefit considerably from the insights of psychoanalysis and legal scholars
should consider it, like other institutions, as a psychic product rooted in the
unconscious."5 In this sense, psychoanalysis is not an external discipline that
analysts "apply" to law, but rather it is intrinsic to an understanding of law
as a cultural system of symbols, as well as a system of repression and an
object of desire, particularly through its rites, ceremonies, and other images.
Specifically in terms of its attempt to address and understand the affective
dimensions of legality, in its aim of analyzing the forms of subjective attachment to law, psychoanalysis effaces the modem boundaries of the legal
discipline and again invites denial or dismissal. In other words, psychoanalysis not only suggests another dimension, or unconscious, of law applying
acts but also, for the same reason, implies that law is a species of mythology,
an illusion or phantasm that fascinates and binds the subjects of the legal
order. 6 For this reason it merits an historical and theoretical analysis that
looks beyond its merely surface and manifest authorities and reasons.

14. 17 SIGMUND FREUD, On the Teaching of Psycho-Analysis in Universities (1919), in
THE STANDARD EDITION, supra note 12, at 171, 173.
15. See, e.g., 19 SIGMUND FREUD, A ShortAccount of Psycho-Analysis(1923), in THE
STANDARD EDITON, supranote 12, at 191,208 (stating "[the researches of psycho-analysis
have in fact thrown a flood of light on the fields of mythology, the science of literature, and

the psychology of artists"). "We have shown that myths and fairy tales can be interpreted like
dreams, we have traced the convoluted paths that lead from the urge of the unconscious wish
to its realization in a work of art, we have learnt to understand the emotional effect of a work
of art on the observer. . . ." Id. For a lucid discussion of this text in relation to the theory
of artistic production, see generally SARAH KOFMAN, THE CHiLDHOOD OF ART: AN INTERPRETATION OF FREUD'S AmETrIcs 1-22 (1988).

16. See generally PETER FrrzPATRICK, THE MYTHOLOGY OF MODERN LAw (1992)
(regarding the various resonances of legal mythology); Goodrich, supra note 10. The doyen
of such analyzes is Pierre Legendre. See generally The Lost Temporality ofLaw: An Interview

with PierreLegendre, 1 LAw & CRITIQUE 3 (1990).
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In the Name of the Father... and of the Son
Consider the following example from a Canadian case that forms the
basis of CorporalLortie's Crime, a treatise by the French psychoanalyst and
lawyer Pierre Legendre.17 The case involves the ill-fated corporal Lortie
who was a young and disaffected member of the Canadian armed forces.
While watching the Prime Minister of Quebec speaking on television, he
formulated a plan to massacre the government of Quebec."8 Some weeks
later, and after careful preparation, Lortie took weekend leave from his base
and checked into a motel close to the Citadel in Quebec." On the morning
of Tuesday, May 28, 1984, in full military combat dress and after taperecording a message announcing and explaining his plan to his wife, the
military chaplain at his base, and a radio talk-show host, he went to the
National Assembly building." Lortie entered the Assembly building armed
with an automatic rifle and ran through the corridors, firing at anyone in his
path." He killed three people and injured eight before he eventually arrived
at the Chamber of Deputies.' On this day when he had chosen to "kill the
government of Quebec, "23 the government was not in session and the Chamber was empty. Lortie sat down in the President's chair and fired a volley
of shots directly in front of him at a clock and to his right at the empty
benches where the representatives would have sat had the Assembly been in
session.2
During interrogation after his arrest, Lortie explained his crime in the
following terms: "[Tihe government of Quebec had the face of my father."'
A number of biographical facts and further comments from Lortie from
subsequent questioning add context to that extraordinary remark. Lortie
came from a family of six.2 His father had been an alcoholic and violently
17. PIERRE LEGENDRE, LE CRIME DU CAPORAL LORTIE. TRAITS SUR LE PkRE [THE
CRIME OF CORPORAL LORTm. A TREATISE ON THE FATHER] (1989). See generally Alain

Pottage, Crime and Culture: The Relevance of the Psychoanalytical,55 MOD. L. REv. 421
(1992) (reviewing The Crime of Corporal Lortie); Peter Goodrich, Introduction:Psychoanalysis and Law, inLAW AND THE UNCONSCIOUS: A LEGENDRE READER 1 (P. Goodrich ed.,
1997) [hereinafter LAW AND THE UNCONSCIOUS].
18. LEGENDRE, supranote 17, at 63.

19. Id. at 89.
20. Id. at 98.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.at 99.
Id.
Id.at 189.
Id. at 99.
Id.at 61.
Id.at 92.
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abused his mother and the children.' His father had also had an incestuous
relationship with Lortie's eldest sister.28 At one point, the children banded
together and secreted a number of weapons around the house, vowing to kill
their father the next time he became violent with them.2 9 After his arrest,
Lortie talked of losing a battle "against an inner negativity,""° expressing a
fear of having internalized the image of his father and a terror of becoming
his father. Another remark also supports this confusion. When shown a
video tape of his crime, Lortie fled the dock in tears and hammered his head
against the wall of his cell.3 When asked who it was in the video, he
acknowledged that "you know I cannot say that it is not me, it is me."32 Just
prior to his arrest, when asked why he had acted as he had, Lortie responded
comparably
by saying, "I cannot tell you. It was not my heart but my
33
head.
The case of Lortie provides an exemplary illustration of the psychoanalytic theory of law and, specifically, of the Oedipal crisis that lies at the
origin of law. The violence of his childhood, and most particularly the
tyrannical behavior of his father, prevented Lortie from being able to attach
himself to any viable image of identity or of family place. When his father
left the family and abandoned Lortie, it was no longer possible to kill him in
person. 4 Thus, struggling with the interior image of his father, Lortie
attempted to resolve his "inner negativity" by projecting the face of his father
onto the government of Quebec and then "killing the government. 01 What
is most striking in this psychotic desire to destroy a social image or phantasm
of paternity is not the madness of the displacement, but rather its peculiar
and inexorable logic. Lortie's failure to attach to or recognize a familial
order and law, expressed through his desire to kill his father, is repeated at
a phantasmic level in his transgression of secular law. The two laws are
based upon analogous figures of paternity and are indissolubly bound to each
other, both in the psyche of the subject and in the symbolism of the social.
The western legal tradition is a Christian tradition and is explicitly a
tradition of utrumque ius or of two laws. Historically, the complementary
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id. at 93
Id.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 99.
Id. at 95.
Id.
Id. at 93.
Id. at 62.
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jurisdictions of spiritual and secular law have split western legality. The
church and canon law governed what would later, and largely inaccurately,
be termed the private sphere; royal law and its secular equivalents governed
the public domain. Although the precise depiction of jurisdictions and laws
varied within different political theologies, the hierarchy of laws was invariant. Divine law preceded natural law, which in turn preceded human or
positive law. Human law was but a pale shadow of divine will and, not least
for this reason, the study of law was conceived consistently as the study of
divine and human rule in both the civilian and the common law traditions.36
The model of such rule was of a divine law dictated by God who sent his
only son to redeem the world and to prepare Christian humanity for eternal
life in a world beyond human comprehension. God's law was at the pinnacle
of the hierarchy of forms of law, and where the emperor or king made law
within the western world, he did so explicitly as the mouthpiece of God the
Father and in imitation of him, his son, and his laws.
The social image of a divine father whose paternal authority legitimated
all other laws suffuses the western legal tradition. A myriad of differing
secular depictions reveals this image. The primacy of the image of the father
is significant. The tradition elaborates this figure of paternity within the
differing jurisdictions and laws of the polity. Regia potestas and patria
potestas, the power of the king and the power of the father, are two instances
or jurisdictions of the same law. Thus, law is the speech of the father or,
more technically, speech "in the name of the father."37 The same image of
paternity provides the model for the social family and the domestic family
and the same genealogical method authorizes these laws. According to this
genealogical method, a law is legitimate if it is issued by, traceable to, or
promulgated in the name of the father. Resurrecting the familial and paternal metaphor of legal governance, the psychoanalytic tradition draws upon
an antiquated tradition that never recognized any meaningful distinction
between the different aspects or jurisdictions of legal rule. The secularization of the legal tradition in the modem period may have attempted, in the
name of reason, to mask the paternal character and figuration of legal
authority. However, it does so only by repressing the history of the different
36. See 1 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 2 (1985) (Ulpian) ("Iurisprudentiaest divinarum
atque humanarum rerum notilia." (Jurisprudence is the knowledge of things divine and
human.)); PETER GOODRICH, LAW IN THE COURTS OF LOVE: LITERATURE AND OTHER
MINOR JURISPRUDENCES 9-28 (1996) (comparing common law definitions of legal study).
37. See generallyROBERT FLM2ER, Patriarcha,in PATRiARCHA AND OTHER POLITICAL
WORKS OF SIR ROBERT FILMER 49 (Peter Laslett ed., 1949) (1680) (discussing paternal
metaphors of government). For an important feminist commentary on Patriarcha,see
CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 82-89 (1988).
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jurisdictions and plural forms of law. The monotheistic culture of the legal
tradition survives in modernity only by pretending to a reason that is both
external and superior to the symbolic reality - the contingent and imagistic
theater of its institutional history.
The myth of Oedipus and the case of Lortie are similar narratives on the
primary attachment of the human subject to the social order of law. In terms
of legal history, this narrative was traditionally the subject matter of canon
or ecclesiastical law and its governance of the soul. Thus, the church courts
and canon law originally governed the interior life of the subject. Spiritual
judges monitored and exercised what were explicitly termed the ghostly
powers dictating how to judge conscience and how to order the soul in
conformity with God's law. Psychoanalytic jurisprudence can thus be
understood initially as bringing with it the inestimable message that the legal
order is still predicated both internally and externally upon images of social
paternity and upon the application of legal rules in the name of the father.
The Freudian tradition endeavors to make conscious a structural feature of
the western legal tradition that is largely unconscious in the modern era that images of a paternal law have consistently bound together subject and
society in the West.3"
Although it may define itself in reference to and specifically against
religion, psychoanalysis is not a theology. Thus, it is important to distinguish the Freudian and post-Freudian accounts of the law of the father from
their historical analogues within the patristic tradition.39 For Freud, the
subject's recognition of paternal authority and consequent obedience to the
father's prohibition of the son's incestuous desire for the mother resolves the
Oedipal crisis at the individual level. That recognition of authority and
repression of desire founds the subjective order of law. The desire to kill the
father gains fulfilment only in dream. In other words, the order of law is a
symbolic order founded not upon the presence or authority of a real father,
but upon what Lacan terms the "paternal metaphor" or "name of the
father. "4 The social order of law has a comparable basis in the pre-historic
38. See GOODRICH, supra note 9, at 108-43, 223-47 (discussing this historical argument).
39. Freud, of course, was well aware of the psychoanalytic significance of Christian
rites and discusses the relation between Christianity and the Oedipus complex in several texts.
See generally 18 SIGMUND FREUD, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego [hereinafter
FREUD, Group Psychology], in THE STANDARD EDmON, supra note 12, at 69; 13 SIGMUND
FREUD, Totem and Taboo: Some Points of Agreement Between the Mental Lives of Savages
andNeurotics [hereinafter FREUD, Totem and Taboo], in THE STANDARD EDITION, supranote
12, at 1; mIE BORCH-JACOBSEN, THE FREUDIAN SuBJEcT 127-39 (1988) (elaborating on
Freud's discussions).

40. See

JACQUES LACAN,

On a Question Preliminary to Any Possible Treatment of
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murder of the tribal father by jealous sons, according to Freud's account in
Totem and Taboo. Without attempting to repeat or justify the dubious
anthropology of Totem and Taboo, it can be observed usefully that Freud
formulates his thesis in terms of the foundation of social authority around the
guilty memory of the murder of a tyrannical father and his replacement by
rituals that bind the social group to a founding image of an absent father.
The power of law derives precisely from the myth of an absent father in
whose name the law can be spoken. It is the power "not of a real father, but41
of what religion has taught us to refer to as the Name-of-the-Father. ,
From this it follows that the Father who authors the law and whose murder
is the founding instance through which "the subject binds himself for life to
the Law, the symbolic Father[,] is, in so far as he signifies this Law, the
dead Father."4' A symbolic debt founds the social order and impels the filial
subject to cohere the group, community, or social order around the ritual
re-enactment of that inaugural parricide.
There are significant problems with the Freudian depiction of the
primary bonding of the individual to the social or, more specifically, the
bonding of the subject to the Father. Not least among these is the male or
homosocial character of the specific narrative that Freud and following him,
Lacan and Legendre, elaborate. The Oedipal myth and the law of the father
depicted in Totem and Taboo both spell out a masculine definition of sociality and law. By analogy with the Christian tradition, both also privilege
the relation of father to son. A legitimate counter to that position is an
assertion of the priority of the relation of mother to daughter, as Irigaray has
argued, or a reinterpretation of the Oedipal story around the feminine image
of the sphinx.43 While such arguments are important in political terms, it is
also arguable that, at least with respect to the classical legal tradition and its
modem variants, Freud accurately accounts the patriarchal constituents of
legality and the patristic images of its authority: the messenger should not be
Psychosis, in IRrrs,supra note 9, at 179, 198-200.
41. Id. at 199.
42. Id. at 199. See generallySLAVOJY 21K, THE METASTASES OF ENJOYMENT (1994).
43. See LUCEIRIGARAY, THmaNG THE DIFFERENCE 89-112 (1994) (discussing feminine

See generally CHRISTIANE OLIVIER, JQCAsTA'S CHILDREN: THE IMPRINT OF
THE MOTHER (1989) (discussing role of mother). For an analysis focusing on the sphinx and
on matricide as the "unthought element of Freudian psychoanalysis," see JEAN-JOSEPH Goux,
OEDIPUS, PHILOSOPHER 23 (1993); J.C. SMITH & CARLA FERSTMAN, THE CASTRATION OF
OEDIPUS: FEMINISM, PSYCHOANALYSIS, AND THE WILL TO POWER (1996). For a depiction
of the homosocial imagery of law, see LUCE IRGARAY, The Poverty of Psychoanalysis,in THE
IRIGARAY READER 79, 79-104 (Margaret Whitford ed., 1992) (presenting a corrective
feminine perspective). See generally BORCH-JACOBSEN, supra note 39; RICHARD COLLIER,
MASCULINITY, LAW AND THE FAMILY (1995).
mythologies).
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shot because of the message.'M Freud's unveiling of the unconscious and,
specifically, his socialized conception of the psyche, his politicization of the
private, opened up the territory that feminism was later to occupy and
rewrite. Additionally, whatever the flaws or idiosyncracies of the figures
through which Freud and later psychoanalytic theorists develop their account
of the primary bond of the individual to sociality and law, the critics of the
Freudian theory of a paternal law do not deny the importance of the unconscious figures of authority. Rather, they question the political desirability or
accuracy of a specifically male metaphor of legality. Thus, critics do not
doubt the domain of the unconscious and the"psychoanalytic method of its
interpretation, but rather call into question the specific interpretation of the
legal institution.
The myth of Oedipus is used by Freud to depict the homosocial form of
the primary bonding of the subject to law. It takes the form of the renunciation of the subject's dual desire to murder his father and marry his mother.
Freud's notion that the subject accepts the "paternal no" and so enters into
the symbolic and into law is most significant at the level of method or
interpretation. The most curious feature of this story is simply why the
subject should renounce his desire or come to internalize the paternal prohibition and thereby identify with the paternal role and the social figure of
authority. Analysts can address the same question to the anthropological
version of the story told in Totem and Taboo by asking why the sons come
to recognize and identify with the ritual re-enactment of the killing of the
father in the various eucharistic ceremonies of totem and totemic food.
Freud's specific answer to this question is that it is precisely through the rite
of eating common food, through the shared guilt of ingesting the dead father,
that the sons come to bond and identify with the social. Regardless of the
prehistoric or Christian details of this homosocial and carnivorous bonding,
the sons are bound together through a ritual which allows them to identify
with the social. The cannibalistic feast, the later eucharistic rite of eating
Christ's body and drinking his blood, and the ritualistic eating of dinners in
44. See JEANNE LORRAINE SCHROEDER, THEVESTALAND THEFASCES: HEGEL, LACAN,
PROPERTY AND THE FEMININE (forthcoming 1998). See generally ELIZABETH GROSZ,
JACQUES LACAN: A FEMINIST INTRODUCTION (1990). To add a personal note, Kate Green,

Book Review, 2 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 361, 361-367 (1993), criticized an earlier work of mine
for using the masculine pronoun in discussing the history and theory of the western legal
tradition and, specifically, for depicting Renaissance and early modem conceptions of the
English constitution and common law in masculine terms. On a first reading, this struck me
as a curious criticism insofar as the theories being discussed, and the constitutional tradition
to which they referred were almost exclusively masculine in tenor and substance. I did not
think that I could change that. On reflection, the criticism seems well-judged as a criticism
of the Oedipal style and the limited narrative project of such historicism.
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the Inns of Court all share the theme of binding a community through an
identificatory ceremony. The images and the symbols that stage such rites
work to bind subjects who were previously rivals. In Freud's words, "they
have succeeded in identifying themselves with one another by means of a
similar love for the same object." 45
Two aspects of this process of identification have an enduring significance for the psychoanalytic interpretation of law. The first is that the figure
with which the sons identify is that of the image of the absent or dead father.
The bonding of the subject to the social is thus effected through images.
Hence, through interpreting the symbolic and addressing the images that
bind the affections and attach the unconscious to law, psychoanalysis reads
and interprets legality as a system of subjective attachment. In its most
extreme form, that of professional attachment to law, the specifically
homosocial quality of such erotic attachments is peculiarly clear. Only thinly
veiled by the quotidian norms of institutional behavior, the competition that
constitutes the everyday world of professionals is the rivalry of brothers
based upon the similarity of the rivals and, by extension, upon the desire for
the same, a homosexual love.
The second and correlative feature of this latent identification or unconscious bonding through figures of attachment is its binding of the subject in
a libidinal or erotic relation to the social. The rivalrous subjects of the
prehistorical scene come to identify with the social image of authority and
do so by means of a similar love with an identical object of desire. Identification generates a positive bond with others not only by sharing the object
of desire but also through the guilty mode of its acquisition and, in the myth
under discussion, its ingestion. The cohesion of the group is based upon a
sacrificial rite, the eating of the flesh and drinking of the blood of a totemic
animal in order to remember an originary killing. In sum, desire and affect
motivate and bind the subject both individually and socially. Identificatory
images joinpsyche and socius. Scarcely hidden beneath the surface reason
of institutional roles, latent within the homosociality of professional relations,
is an erotic bond, a narcissistic love of a rival in whom the subject recognizes himself.' An emotional substance, an erotics, is latent in objective
relations. This means that it is only through a reading of repressed desires
and through an attention to the symptoms or figures that evidence the return
45. FREUD, Group Psychology, supra note 39, at 120; see also GOODRICH, supra note
36, at 72-94 (discussing eating rites and identification in law).
46. See generally RENATA SALECL, THE SPOILS OF FREEDOM (1994); KLAUS THEWELEIT, OBJECT-CHOICE (ALL YOU NEED IS LovE... ) (1994) (discussing the erotic in the
social); SLAvOJ 2EK,FOR THEY KNOW NOT WHAT THEY Do: ENJOYMENT AS A POLITICAL
FACTOR (1991).
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of the subjective in the objective that psychoanalysis can begin to address the
unconscious of law.
Author andAuthority: On the Paternityof the Legal Text
According to established common law tradition, judges do not create
law, but "discover" and apply it, even when deciding cases in novel areas of
doctrine.' Where the ambit of a rule is expanded or curtailed, traditional
legal wisdom holds that the judge is not inventing or embellishing law, but
rather exposing the inner logic and necessity of extant norms. The modem
judiciary has on occasion admitted that this notion of judicial discovery of
law and correlative objectivity of judicial determinations is broadly untenable. Nonetheless, this admission has not lead to any extensive rethinking of
the subjective or affective dimensions of judgment. Legal thinkers generally
deem such dimensions to be imponderable aspects of an unknowable justice
and not, strictly speaking, questions of law. For this reason, one of the first
stylistic and semantic lessons of the legal curriculum is still that the student
of law cannot write in the first person singular. The student's T is instantaneously deleted or erased because law is objective and the affinities or
opinions, experiences or beliefs, of the subject are deemed irrelevant and
indeed heretical to the exposition and manipulation of legal rules. What is
traditionally sought in the library of legal texts is authority and such authority or law is not a property of the living, but an attribute of the dead and of
their texts. By the same token, living authors within the English common
law tradition cannot be treated as authoritative, supposedly because the living
can change their minds or contradict themselves.' Only dead treatise writers
can be treated as having authority because only the dead parent or absent
father can truly attain to the aura and absolutism of law. In Legendre's
felicitous 49formulation, "in the epiphany of law, the jurist counts for
nothing.
47. The strongest version of this tenet is to be found in 2 SIR EDWARD COKE, REPORTS,

fol. b.5.a (1776), who argues that common law, stemming from time immemorial, from
"beyond the memory or register of any beginning," is of such antiquity and self-evident
veracity that not even historians are qualified to examine its records. By the same logic,
attempts by parliament or unwise judges to reform the law are doomed to failure and to being
reversed because in hominis vitium non professionis (it is not law but men who err). Id. at xi;
see GOODRICH, supra note 10, at 83-90 (discussing Coke's theories).
48. See Lord Diplock, A.L.G.:A Judge's View, 91 LAW Q. REV.457, 458-59 (1975);
see also WILLIAM TWINING, BLACKSTONE'S TOWER 135 (1994) (lamenting the continued

unwillingness of the English judiciary to take academic writings of living (or quite frequently
dead) treatise writers seriously).
49. LEGENDRE, supra note 12, at 96.
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This denial of identity and erasure of personality initially poses the
question of what such repression costs. It is commonplace that lawyers take
no ethical responsibility for their clients and make whatever arguments best
suit their case or cause. In slightly more expansive terms, the lawyer's
denial of emotion and suppression of subjectivity is likely to make the lawyer
at the very least emotionally dishonest and ill-equipped to deal with the
realms of feeling, of fear and desire, inhabited by their clients and indeed by
their non-legal contacts. In one argument, the repression that initiates legal
identity slowly transforms the lawyer into an emotional incompetent, a withdrawn, abstracted, and frequently lost soul. As many critics have argued,
what was initially a mask becomes the person." Trained systematically to
deny their feelings and trained equally to communicate with others in conflicting and antagonistic forms, the lawyer's denial of subjectivity can easily
become a form of life. The company of lawyers is customarily shunned
because their training encourages alienation and self-estrangement. Such
lack of feeling distances the lawyer from the lifeworld. One recent critical
argument asserts that it is precisely this distance or suppression of affectivity
that disables the lawyer from genuinely understanding or communicating
with his clients or, in terms of judgment, with the parties to litigation.51 If,
in the antique legal maxim, to do justice is to follow the heart - corde
creditur ad iustitiam - then how can justice be done by a subject who
cannot feel? At an even more basic level, how can a subject who is trained
to deny his identity and to suppress both emotion and its expression begin to
understand the lifeworld or existential context and so also the meaning of
other lives? Who would choose a lawyer as a judge?
The professional detachment, the abstraction, and the dullness of the
lawyer are psychoanalytically disturbing features of a profession that still
clings to a religious past, the sacral aura of an archaic mythology of objectivity, a theistic phantasm of certainty and its accompanying science of rule
application. It is at the very least highly ironic that law, the pre-eminent
50. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HEERAR1-32 (1983) (discussing legal education); BENJAMIN SELLS, THE SOUL OF THE LAW 99128 (1994) (discussing the adverse emotional effects of joining the legal profession); PIERRE
LEGENDRE, L'EMPIRE DE LA vtRrTE 160 (1983). "Speaking with the brutal directness of a
pedagogue, I would say that jurists are distinct by virtue of the following trait: they do not
even pretend to think, they merely practice the social art of putting texts into circulation. It
CHY

is for this reason that the company of jurists is so commonly dreaded. . .

.".

Id.

51. Linda G. Mills, On the Other Side of Silence: Affective Lawyeringfor Intimate
Abuse, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 1225, 1248-52 (1996). For other developments of this theme,
see generally Peter Goodrich, Epistolary Justice: The Love Letter as Law, 9 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 245 (1997).
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discourse of individual responsibility, should be dispensed by a profession
which systematically denies the responsibility of the jurist and the judge for
the rules they find, interpret, and apply. The deletion of the "I" in law
students' essays is exemplary not only of an initiation rite or trauma in which
the student embarks upon the ritual passage from laity to professionalism,
but also of a repression that is intrinsic to the political logic of law. To
distinguish legal judgment, and particularly its obscurity and violence, from
other political practices requires what Freud termed a myth or fiction of legal
authority that is capable of transferring the mundane exercise of power into
a sacral or inaugural realm of incontestable meanings. Law must differentiate itself from secular speech by hiding the source of its authority behind the
image of dead authors and an inexorable tradition of untouchable texts,
immemorial precedents, and an initiate and frequently incomprehensible
knowledge. By abdicating any direct responsibility for the creation of law,
the judge can deny the affective dimensions of legal judgment and so also
deny subjective responsibility for them. In modernity, the absent sources or
dead authors of "the law" who thus protect the profession both from political
criticism and personal self-reflection have taken the form not simply of the
paternal image of an absent sovereign or author, but the more specific form
of a textual tradition and of books that encompass and preserve an antique
custom and law.
The mystery of law or arcana iuris in the western tradition is historically a scriptural one. Texts lock away the enigma of legal rule, and interpretation of texts reveals law - its rules, its dreams, and its practices.52 In
Freudian terms, the primary attribute of such texts is their authority: the
legal text or book of the law is historically and practically the word of the
father, a word spoken in the name of an absent and absolute authority. The
textual tradition that bears this authority traces back to the reception of
Roman law in the West in the late eleventh century and the "interpretative
revolution"' that accompanied the rediscovery of the corpus iuris civilis. Its
strongest theological expression is not only in the sanctity of religious and
secular legal texts, but also in the culturally more pervasive image of biblical
52. See generally Cornelia Vismann, Cancels: On the Making of Law in Chanceries, 7
LAW AND CRITIQuE 131 (1996) (providing a recent and highly suggestive analysis of the

textual fabrication of law). Cf.RICHARD SussKIND, THE FUTURE OF LAW: FACING THE
CHALLENGES OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (1996).
53. The concept of interpretative revolution is one developed by Pierre Legendre. See,

e.g., PI RE LEGENDRE, LEs ENFANTS DU TEM. ETUDE SUR LA FONCTION PARENTALE DES
ETATS [CHILDREN OF THE TExT.A STUDY OF THE PARENTAL FUNCTION OF STATES] (1992).
For discussion, see Goodrich, supranote 17, at 1, 20-32; see generally HAROLD J.BERMAN,
LAw AND REVOLUTION (1983) (presenting the notion of legal revolution).
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authority and the various reassertions of the primacy of the scriptures and of
the written word over its prophets and institutional interpreters.' The importance of this tradition of textual authority and priestly interpreters is not, however, the historical detail of rediscovery and renewal of the textual system
and its interpretative principles so much as the form or dogmatic character
of the legal knowledge it engendered. According to the dogmatic tradition,
the text, the record of prior laws, contains the truth. All that one needs to
find that truth is a proper appreciation of the principles of textual construction or legal hermeneutics. The text is everything. The interpreter is
nothing but a simple tool or instrument of a law that speaks from elsewhere
and with the full authority of its absent author. The Oedipal dead father, one
might say, both exonerates and rules over the children of the text.
PsychoanalyticHermeneutics
The alien written form of law serves the political purpose of hiding or
masking the exercise of authority and the correlative violence of power
behind the faceless image of scripture or of the interminable books of the
law. One might say that the subject of law is buried in a morass of texts and
scriptural rules that, according to the theory of dogmatics or legal science,
inexorably determine the outcomes of contemporary cases. In the classical
terminology that founds contemporary method, the law is a mute magistrate
(mutus magistratus)or an inanimate justice (iustitiainanimata), a text which
the lawyer must bring to speech.55 Legal training teaches the lawyer, and
most particularly the judge, to apply the law in a rational fashion. It teaches
them to present the justification of judgment or reason for deciding as if
objectively determined by discovered rules. The lawyer uses legal method
to reformulate the subjectivity of judgment in the objective garb of rules.
Legal training denies creative application of the law. The legal subjects who
fashion the contemporary texts of law present themselves as instruments or
servants of a law that would certainly exist and could probably just as well
speak without them. The rhetorical form of this textual self-effacement is at
times explicit - according to one well-established maxim, to govern is to
dissimulate, to rule is to deceive - and the lawyer is an expert in precisely
such rules or methods of self-concealment or deception. 56 In this regard,
54. See Peter Goodrich, Traditions of Interpretationand the Status of the Legal Text,
53, 53-69 (1986) (discussing the historical details of this tradition).
55. SiR JOHN DAVIES, LE PRIMER REPORT DES CASES AND MATrERS EN LEY RESOLVES
AND ADJUDGES IN LES COURTS DEL ROY EN IRELAND fol. 7b (Dublin, Frankton 1615); see
6

LEGAL STUD.

GOODRICH, supra note 10, at 249 (discussing Davies' work).
56. See GEORGE PUTrENHAM, THE ARTE OF ENGLISH POESIE 155 (London, Richard
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psychoanalysis principally offers jurisprudence another method of reading
legal texts, one which endeavors to address what is repressed or masked in
the obscure and indirect language of law. In the first instance, the language
of legal texts is the only, and most usually negative, expression of the
motives, the affects, or desires of those who judge. As Benjamin Cardozo
once observed, an unconscious element to the development of law always
exists, not least in the repetition through which precedent, the contingent or
accidental product of an agonistic practice, becomes an established rule or
principle of law.
The Interpretationof Dreams and its subsequent revisions most fully
develops the interpretative method of psychoanalysis. For Freud, the text
is a symptom or code that must be deciphered, an enigma that must be
unveiled or unmasked through analytic techniques of reconstruction. In its
simplest form, psychoanalysis reads the text in terms of unconscious causes
and so treats its surface as the trace or symptom of repressed meanings. The
written text is treated as comparable to the language and images of dreams;
it is a sign of erotic or violent affects, of the "remains of the day." 58 The
text is to be interpreted in the psychoanalytic sense of being read with close
attention to all its unwitting details, attentive as much to what it endeavors
to hide as to what it consciously seeks to express. In general terms, the text
is thus understood as a psychic production, an expression of desire or of
erotic drive covered over or compromised by the demands of civility and
law. The method developed in The Interpretationof Dreams is one that is
thus gauged towards uncovering the primal or originary sources of the
manifest text. In Freudian terms, what is originary and essential is sexual
and constituted by the Oedipal structure of individual biography: "Our work
of interpretation uncovers, so to say, the raw material, which must often
enough be described as sexual in the widest sense, but which has found the
most varied application in later adaptations. "9 Freud adds that "[d]erivations
of this kind are apt to bring down on us the wrath of all non-analytically
schooled workers, as though we were seeking to deny or undervalue everything that was later erected on the original basis.""' Like the dream or
Field 1589) ("[Q]ui nescit dissimularenescit regnare." (He who knows how to dissimulate,
knows how to rule.)).
57. See, e.g., Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank, 159 N.E. 173

(N.Y. 1927).
58. See Renata Salecl, Love: Providenceor Despair,23 NEw FORMATIONS 13, 13-24
(1995) (discussing the vestigial qualities of content of dreams).
59. SIGMUND FREuD, Revision of the Theory of Dreams, in NEW INTRODUCTORY LECTURES 7,23 (1965).
60. Id.
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indeed any other psychic production, the legal text covers over the primal,
or in our terms, affective material that originates it. The text hides and
transforms what Freud calls the enigma or riddle of its cause: "The analysts
work of construction, or, if it is preferred, of reconstruction, resembles to
a great extent an archaeologist's excavation of some dwelling-place that has
been destroyed and buried or of some ancient edifice."61
To pursue the unconscious meaning of a text leads Freud to develop
certain classical tools of rhetoric as the method most appropriate to deciphering the emotional content of language.62 The text is a product of conflicting
forces. Indeed, every text is a compromise between desire and its prohibition, between eros and law, and its surface must be analyzed for the signs or
traces of that conflict and its unconscious roots. What this means in terms
of legal texts is not very different from the method developed to read the
individual psyche - in terms of the traces or figures, of earlier experiences
or repressed histories. A successful interpretation or better construction will
lay before the subject "a piece of his history that he has forgotten."'63 By the
same token, analysis of a legal text will ideally reconstruct the invisible
desire or repressed affectivity of its author. The method for doing this is one
of detail in that it requires the textual reconstruction of an individual or
collective past through fragments, symbols, figures, and other lacuna or
clues within the surface text.6 Truth, in psychoanalytic terms, is given only
in distortions. The trace is what remains of what has been repressed and
denied, modified, and removed from its context, or displaced. For this
reason, Freud, in conformity with earlier theories of dream analysis, argues
that every detail, however apparently accidental is significant and must be
attended to.' Indeed, the seemingly incidental features of the text, the
repetitions, apparently innocent embellishments or metaphoric digressions,
will often transpire to be the most vital clues as to the hidden sense or desire
of the text. The latent content of the text can only be read in terms of its
effacement, in terms of the traces that are all that are left of the past. The
traces are clues that put one on the track of the repressed. In a suitably
Oedipal metaphor, Freud argues that
61. SIGMUND FREUD, MOSES AND MONOTHEISM: THREE ESSAYS 259 (1953).
62. This argument is developed in GOODRICH, supra note 9, at 181-89. See generally
SEBAsno TIMPANARO, THE FREUDIAN SLIP: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND TEXTUAL CRIICISM

(1976) (presenting a contrary view).
63. FREUD, supra note 61, at 261.
64. See Freud, supra note 59, at 81.
65. For an earlier version of this argument, made in relation to what was then the
discipline of onirocriticism, see generally HENRY CORNELIUS AGRIPPA, OF THE VANITIE AND
UNCERTAINTIE OF ARTES AND SCIENCES (London, Bynneman 1575).
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if you were a detective engaged in tracing a murder, would you expect to
find that the murderer had left his photograph behind at the place of the
crime, with his address attached? Or would you not necessarily have to be
satisfied with comparatively slight and obscure traces of the person you
were in search of? So do not let us under-estimate small indications ....66
Affect and Judgment
Moving to the specific realm of legal texts, the requirement of minute
attention to detail should in many senses be attractive to lawyers. It also
recalls the techniques of forensic rhetoric whereby analysis of legal texts
paid close attention to the forms of expression or figures of speech to be
found in legal language. The rhetorician studied the figures of speech as
indications of emotion or affective content. 67 The figures were symptoms of
a repressed passion. It is precisely in this rhetorical sense that Freud returns
to the theory of figures as a theory of the imagistic and emotive residues of
archaic experience in contemporary language. 6' The figures of speech, in
other words, are an exemplary site of psychoanalytic interpretation and any
attempt to reconstruct the latent meaning of legal judgments will ideally start
with the textual figures that mark the affective content of the judgment. The
case of Masterson v. Holden69 can provide a peculiarly English example of
the utility (and the melancholy) of psychoanalytic method in law.7"
The apparent logic of the case can be stated succinctly. Decided in
1986, the case concerned two men, Simon Thomas Masterson and Robert
Matthew Cooper who were "kissing each other on the lips"7 1 and cuddling
at a bus stop in the center of London.' The justices found that
Cooper rubbed the back of Masterson with his right hand and later Cooper moved his hand from Masterson's back and placed it on Masterson's
66.

15 SIGMUND FREUD, IntroductoryLectures on Psycho-analysis, in THE STANDARD

EDITION, supra note 12, at 27. For an excellent development of this analogy in terms of
decipherment in art history, see Carlo Ginsburg, Clues:Roots of an EvidentialParadigm, in
MYTHS, EMBLEMS, CLUES 96, 96-125 (1990).
67. This argument is made in detail in Peter Goodrich, JaniAnglorum: Signs, Symptoms, Slips and Interpretationin Law, in POLITICS, POSTMODERNITY AND CRITICAL LEGAL
STUDIES 107, 107-144 (Costas Douzinas et al. eds., 1994).

68. FREUD, supra note 4, at 442.
69. 3 All E.R. 39 (C.A. 1986).
70. See Masterson v. Holden, 3 All E.R. 39 (C.A. 1986); GOODRICH, supra note 10,
at 230-59 (discussing Masterson); LESLIE J.MORAN, THE HOMOSExuAL(rrY) OF LAw 170-71
(1996) (same).
71. Masterson, 3 All E.R. 39, 40 g.
72. Id.at 40 g.
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bottom and squeezed his buttocks. Cooper then placed his hand on
Masterson's genital area and rubbed his hand round this area. The
defendants continued kissing and cuddling.7'

The state charged the couple and found them guilty of a breach of the
peace under Section 54 of the Metropolitan Police Act of 1839, a statute
approximately one hundred and fifty years old.74 The section under which
they were convicted states that an offense is committed by "Every Person
who shall use any threatening, abusive, or insulting Words or Behaviour
with intent to provoke a Breach of the Peace, or whereby a Breach of the
Peace may be occasioned."7" On appeal, the decision at first instance was
upheld on the basis that the magistrates' interpretation of the statute was
correct, and that the behavior in question was capable of being and indeed
was insulting.76 More dramatically and surprisingly, the court expressly
stated that the fact that the couple kissing was gay was irrelevant to the
decision.'
A psychoanalytic reconstruction of the justificatory argument of Lord
Justice Glidewell in the Court of Appeal will attend to a number of incidental
features, or more properly figures, in the judgment. The first is a grammatical slip -

in rhetorical terms a solecism, legally a misprision -

in the

legislation itself. Glidewell remarks: "I note in passing that the wording of
the offence under the 1839 Act uses the verb 'may' have been occasioned in
relation to the question of breach of the peace. Grammatically perhaps it
should be 'might', though nothing turns on that ... ,08 Note first that it is
highly curious that a judge trained in a common law tradition in which each
"syllable is significant and known to the law" and in which the "infinite
particulars" of the text constitute the law should deny the relevance of a
grammatical slip, or what rhetoricians called cacozelia.79 The figure, it will
be argued, reveals a hidden sense. In psychoanalytic terms, the denial of the
relevance of this slip is even more significant. Why draw attention to a
grammatical defect if its only significance is that it is of no relevance? The
conscious disavowal of the relevance of the use of the wrong tense may be
73. Id. at 40 g-h.
74. Id. at40e.
75. Id. at39n.a.
76. Id. at 44 b.
77. Id. at 44 c-d.
78. Id. at 40 e-f.
79. See 10 CoKE, supranote 47, at 130 (discussing "[w]ords significant, and known to
the sages of the law, but not allowed by grammarians, nor having any countenance of Latin"
(citing James Osborne's Case)).
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a clue or symptom of a deeper investment or unconscious meaning to the
slip. In strict Freudian terms, the disavowal is a negation, "a way of taking
cognizance of what is repressed" while simultaneously defending oneself
against it.'
One reading of the change of tense would thus suggest that it is significant of the emotional charge of the case. The judge is determined, at any
cost, to represent the decision as one which is clear in law and unrelated to
any feelings, experiences, or phantasms that might, for him or for others, be
occasioned by homosexuality or homosexual behavior. The negation, in
other words, is defensive. It disowns the repressed thought, namely that the
decision clearly discriminates against homosexuals and refuses to address the
rights or permissible forms of representation of a victimized group. In short,
the use of the present tense "may" is of much wider semantic ambit than
would be the past tense "might." Anything "may" be insulting, whereas a
smaller category of behaviors "might" be deemed insulting. May connotes
possibility; might suggests a domain of probability. That Glidewell deems
this distinction irrelevant consciously indicates that he sees the decision as
remarkably unproblematic. In unconscious terms, the opposite is true. The
assertion of irrelevance masks a powerful latent significance.
One can strengthen the psychoanalytic argument by turning to a second
striking feature in the judgment, one of comparison or, in technical terms,
syncrisis, the comparison of contrary things in the same sentence.8 ' The
sentence in question comes as part of a discussion of the meaning of "insulting behavior" and reads as follows: "Overt homosexual conduct in a public
street, indeed overt heterosexual conduct in a public street, may well be
considered by many persons to be objectionable, to be conduct which ought
to be confined to a private place. "8 The most obvious and probably intended implication of the comparison is that there is no difference between
homosexual and heterosexual behavior in public and that in consequence the
law in its majesty will treat each the same and with equal severity. Again,
the judge is engaged in a surprising denial: the case concerns overt homosexual behavior in a public space and the charge is that this behavior was insulting to unspecified members of the public, particularly women. 83 To claim
that the homosexual nature of the behavior is immaterial either to the charge
80. 19 SIGMUND FREUD, Negation, in THE STANDARD EDmON, supra note 12, at 235,
235-36.
81.
Scholars'
82.
83.

HENRY PEACHAM, THE GARDEN OF ELOQUENCE 162 (Harry R. Warfel ed.,
Facsimiles & Reprints 1954) (1593).
Masterson v. Holden, 3 All E.R. 39, 44 c-d (1986).
Id. at 40 e-j.
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or to the law is not simply a denial of the cultural meaning of the behavior,
but is also a direct refusal to address the facts of the case and the questions
of sexuality that they raise.
The comparison is charged with unconscious meaning. It is uncanny in
its denial of the behavior that is at the heart of the case. To borrow from
Sarah Kofinan, "[i]t is in its very veiling that the text displays what it is
hiding, which is to be found nowhere as a present meaning. ' In other
words, it is probable that the conscious denial of the relevance of the homosexuality of the conduct at issue in the case is a failed form of expression of
the opposite, namely that the judge is threatened by this issue, by the question of homosexuality, and this fear silently and unconsciously determines
the whole course of the decision. Put differently, why would the judge deny
the essential nature of the conduct at issue in the case, if not to disassociate
himself from it and so to continue to defend himself against it?' The innocence of the lawyer, here Glidewell's refusal to take responsibility for his
decision as to the meaning of insulting behavior on the facts of the case, is
further evidenced through the use of determinedly hypothetical reconstructions of the behavior. In this instance, the rhetorical figure is that of mimesis
or mimicking of another's speech. 6
Immediately after likening homosexual to heterosexual behavior in
public, Glidewell continues to argue that "the display of such objectionable
conduct in a public street may well be regarded by another person, particularly by a young woman, as conduct which insults her by suggesting that she
is somebody who would find such conduct in public acceptable herself." 7
Glidewell states that the legal basis for this hypothesis is a precedent decision, Parkinv. Norman,88 in which the Queen's Bench defined homosexual
behavior capable of being insulting by asking whether the behavior was
"tantamount to a statement, 'I believe you are another homosexual,' which
the average heterosexual would surely regard as insulting."8 9 The explicit
homophobia of this imaginary statement is striking not least because it
precisely distinguishes homosexual from heterosexual behavior. A woman
would not by this logic be insulted by behavior that was tantamount to the
84.
85.

KOFMAN, supra note 15, at 55.
See J. LAPLANcHE&J.-B. PONTALiS, THE LANGUAGE OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 261-63

(1973) (explaining negation).
86. PEAcHAM, supra note 81, at 138-39.
87. Masterson, 3 All E.R. at 44 d.
88. 2 All E.R. 583 (Q.B. 1982).
89. Parkin v. Norman, 2 All E.R. 583, 588 (Q.B. 1982); see also Masterson v. Holden,
3 All E.R. 39, 42 f to 43 b (1986).
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statement: "I believe you are a heterosexual." However much he may deny
or endeavor to veil it, it is precisely the homosexual character of the behavior which is objectionable to the judge.
It would be possible to carry the analysis further and to speculate at
length upon why the judges are possessed of this fear that dare not speak its
name, but the hermeneutic value of psychoanalytic method should by now
be apparent. 90 Legal training was classically a sacred rather than a secular
calling and, among other virtues, it inculcated those of celibacy, restraint,
reverence, and modesty. Obviously, the modem profession is no longer
explicitly religious in its public representations, even though aspects of the
monastic origins of the profession and, particularly, the trappings of a
homosocial community remain to direct the neophyte lawyer to the
self-effacing goals of a venal practice. In its modem form, the profession
replaces belief in the divine source of law with a strictly demarcated faith in
its objectivity. To the extent that it is distinct as a social practice, law
presents itself as a species of logic that deals with the necessary forms of
manipulation of established rules. The subject is nothing within this
self-conception of a dogmatic or scientific practice. Psychoanalysis offers
another reading of the texts and the logic of law. It recollects the classical
definition of law as an art (ars iuris) and of legal practice as being, among
other things, a branch of aesthetics. It seeks the subjectivity, the eros or
desire, in law that motivates a subject to think or a lawyer to act. Psychoanalysis offers a "double reading,"91 an analysis that reconstructs the subjective history of the text and recoups the images and other phantasms that play
upon the legal soul. The truth of the psychoanalytic reading is thus one that
exists at a different level to the surface text or conscious manipulation of
legal rules. The psychoanalytic reading seeks out an affectivity that lawyers
are traditionally constrained to hide or deny. It analyzes the creativity of
judgment in a text that can only express that creativity in the form of repression. It addresses the femininity of a masculine profession and, ironically in
light of the example of Masterson, reconstructs the traces of that femininity
in the slips and other figures and images of the books of law.
Eros in Legality
The success of a psychoanalytic interpretation of legal texts depends
upon an understanding of the text, like the psyche, as being the product of
conflicting forces. The text is a tissue of differing meanings, and it can be
90. For other examples of the use of a psychoanalytic method of interpreting cases, see
GOODRICH, supra note 9, at 181-222.
91. KOFMAN, supra note 15, at 53-103.
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read both as an intentional and rational expression of normative decision-making and as the trace of a conflict between desire and prohibition,
eros and legality. This implies that there is more than one logic or reason
to the text, that the surface reasoning conceals "another scene" or "beyond"
of legal meaning and rule that one must reconstruct from the traces or
vestiges of unconscious desire. This does not mean that this other dimension
of the text is wholly negative or that the fact of repression should lead the
analyst to discount the phantasms and other images of the unconscious. The
conflict or compromise that produces the legal text is not merely productive.
It is also in many respects positive, and the legal tradition has always in part
acknowledged and venerated the existence of this unconscious or phantasmic
level of meaning.
Early modem treatises on legal method mimicked theological hermeneutics by referring to a meaning that lay beyond words - out of hearing
(subauditio) or underneath discernment (subintellectio) - in a power or
spirit of law that no text or bare words could wholly encompass. Thus, most
famously, Coke talked of a truth of law that cannot be read in words, but
which ought to be loved.' The civilian Sir Robert Wiseman, in The Law of
Laws, was even more expansive:
The law does not lie in the word but in the feeling, not in the surface or
leaves of the text, but in the innermost affection or interior meaning ....
No words, forms, niceties, or propriety of language, is of any regard in
the Civil Law, in comparison of truth, faithfulness and integrity. 3

In more contemporary and less explicitly erotic terms, judges frequently
refer to a particularistic reason, common sense, or conscience of law that
escapes any precise formulation in precedent or any explicit statutory definition. Rather, it develops out of the agonistics of pure practice, the pragmatic
and particularistic intuition of judgment. More formally, one could say that
the conventions of custom, the maxims of equity, principles of method,
unwritten tradition (communis opinio iuris), and erudite opinion (traditio),
all form reservoirs of an indistinct authority that belongs to the truth or
power and force of law (vim ac potestatem) and not to its more prosaic
forms.' Behind the rules of law and the calculations of decision making lie
92. 3 COKE, supra note 47, at xxii (stating "fin lectione non verba sed veritas est
amanda"); see LAN MACLEAN, INTERPRETATION AND MEANING INTHE RENAISSANCE: THE
CASE OF LAW 158-178 (1992) (discussing this theme and relevant maxims from the DIGEST
to the Renaissance); GOODRICH, supra note 9, at 16-40.
93. SIR ROB. WISEMAN, THE LAW OF LAws OR THE EXCELLENCY OF THE CIVIL LAw

70-71 (London, Royston 1656) ("Lex non in verbis sed in sensu, non in superficie etfollis
verborum, sed in medulla consistit . . .").

94. THE DIGEST OF JusTINIAN, supranote 36, at 12 (Celsus) (stating "[s]cire leges non
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a series of images or phantasms of justice that are inaccessible to rationalistic
forms of legal analysis. Yet, they play a crucial role both in the art of
judgment and the public presence of law. Images of legal authority, emotive
depictions of justice, incidental figures of legal language, and colors of
judgment all provide a psychoanalytic jurisprudence with glimpses of what
lawyers desire and what the subjects of law "addict" themselves to, believe
in,
or learn to love.'
At the level of the social recognition of the legitimacy of sovereignty
and acceptance of the absolutism and violence of law, the subject is fascinated by and attached to images and not to rules. The love of law is a
mystical love, a strange love, addressed to an indistinct power or authority
that lies beyond the text or black-letter forms of legal rule. Prior to examining the positive form of such addiction to law or love of power, the motivating features of legal life and professional practice, it is again necessary to
comment upon the problem of resistance. One of the most novel and yet
least developed aspects of Freud's thought was the discovery - or more
properly reassertion - that the unconscious thinks in images. 96 For this
reason, a psychoanalytic hermeneutics analyzes the legal text for traces of
images or for figurative signs of the phantasmic presence of repressed
memories.' The logic of memory is associative and imagistic, reconstructing by reference to affects and to phantasms or projections of the past that
have nothing to do with the linear representation of time and reason in
consciousness. Thus, in his essay on Screen Memories, Freud compares the
construction of childhood memories to that of works of fiction. It is a
phantasmal construction from memory traces and has a plastic or theatrical
form. It puts the past into play by distorting it. "It may indeed be queshoc est verba earum tenere, sed vim ac potestatem").
95. The theme of addiction to law is a common one within the tradition. See, e.g., SIR
EDWARD COKE, A BOOK OF ENTRIES (London, Streeter 1610) (pursuing similar themes of
addiction to and desire for law); SIR ROGER NORTH, A DISCOURSE ON THE STUDY OF THE
LAWS (London, White 1650) (providing eloquent discussion of the obsessive and relentless
quality of legal study). WILLAM FULBECKE, A DErON OR A PREPARATivE TO THE STUDY
OF THE LAw (1980) is subtitled "wherein it is showed what things ought to be observed and
used of them that are addicted to the study of law."
96. FREUD, supra note 4, at 82 ("Dreams think essentially in images."). The medievals,
of course, already recognized that thought was a combination of images of things -formae
imaginariae,or more properly rei effigies - and understanding (intellectus). See BRIAN
STOCK, THE IMPLICATIONS OF LITERACY 329-85 (1983) (providing informative discussion of
this theme in relation to early theories of text). See generally M.T. CLANcHY, FROM MEMORY TO WRITTEN RECORD (1979); Peter Goodrich, Literacy and the Languages of the Early
Common Law, 14 J.L. & Soc. 422 (1987).
97. See KOFMAN, supra note 15, at 58-64; see also Jacques Derrida, Freud and the
Scene of Writing, in WRITING AND DIFFERENCE 196, 196-231 (1978).
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tioned whether we have any memories at all from our childhood: Memories
relatingto our childhood may be all that we possess. Our childhood memories show us our earliest years not as they were, but as they appeared at the
later periods when the memories were aroused."98 In short, the subsequent
arousal forms the memory rather than merely and passively discovering it.
For Freud, the model of childhood memory was of general significance,
and collective memory, history, and in legal terms precedent obey a similar
logic of construction.99 In memory the past appears in a distorted and
deferred form. It answers to the desire of the historian or to the legal source
of its arousal or invocation. In this context, we should understand and
address it in terms of the images and imaginations that form and govern it.
By the same token, an analysis of law as a culture or form of life will need
to look at lawyers, and by extension, the whole institution of law, of sovereignty, precedent, and judgment, as also being an aesthetic enterprise or, in
Freud's terms, an erotic undertaking. It is pre-eminently a tradition, a
projection and reconstruction of the past, a work of memory. At the level
of legal texts, at that of law's professional community and at that of the
social identification or recognition of governance, the logic of subjective
attachment to law and so also of obedience to law or application of it depends upon the logic of imagination and the power of images far more than
it relies upon scholasticism or the cold dead form of legal prose. The
libidinal relay of legality is comprised of a love of texts, a reverence for the
past, a strict observance of the icons of authority or licit images of legal
paternity, and a powerfully homosocial sense of normality and community.
As the analysis of Mastersonv. Holden began to suggest, one can depict the
western legal institution as aggressive, white, heterosexual, and carnivorous.
To look for the truth, the power or faith that lies beyond the compromises
and rationalizations of the text, the mere words of the law, is thus to look at
a community of (repressed) affections, a system of phantasmic reconstructions, a structure of erotic attachment or of legal love. The point to be
stressed is that the images that govern and move legal judgment are an
essential resource for the understanding of legal practice. They are a reservoir of positive knowledge and one should address them as such. One
example will have to suffice.
98. 3 SIGMUND FREUD, Screen Memories, in THE STANDARD EDITION, supra note 12,
at 302, 322.
99. See FREUD, Totem and Taboo, supra note 39, at ch. 3 (providing most striking
analysis of construction of social memory); see also KOFmAN, supra note 15, at 62 ("The
historical memory of nations constructs a history in an after-the-fact temporality, based on real
events and with a pragmatic aim. All that remains of the actual past is an obscure tradition
preserved in legends, which poets - especially epic poets - take hold of.").
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Anima Legis or the Spirit of Law
In the 1987 case Atria v. British Gasplc,10 the English Court of Appeal
dramatically extended the law relating to the recoverability of damages for
psychiatric harm. 1 The case, though anomalous, is highly instructive in
that it provides a dramatic and reasonably accessible glimpse of the legal
soul. Mrs. Attia employed the defendants to install central heating in her
house in Middlesex."° "[R]eturning home at about 4 pm on 1 July 1981 she
saw smoke coming from the loft of the house. She telephoned the fire
brigade but, by the time the firemen arrived, the whole house was on
fire .

. .

. [O]bviously the house and its contents were extensively dam-

aged."'0 3 The defendants admitted liability in negligence for the physical
damage to the house, but the question remained whether the plaintiff could
recover damages for "nervous shock," the psychiatric harm occasioned by
seeing her "home and its contents ablaze" for a period of somewhat over
four hours.'1 4 The Court of Appeal unanimously held that the psychiatric
damage occasioned by seeing "her home and possessions damaged and/or
destroyed"'15 was recoverable. In some respects the decision was an obvious
one, simply extending the general criterion of foreseeability to a new situation. The categories of negligence, as Lord Macmillan once observed, are
never closed. The stronger argument, however, is that the decision is
anomalous both in terms of lacking doctrinal justification and in terms of
failing to accord with existing precedent.
The extant law on recoverability of damages for psychiatric harm at the
time of the Attia v. British Gas plc decision was the recent House of Lords
decision in McLoughlin v. O'Brian. 6 In terms of doctrinal development,
the McLoughlin decision explicitly established a multiple test of proximity. 7
In that decision, Lord Wilberforce stated that three elements were inherent
in any claim: "the class of persons whose claims should be recognized; the
proximity of such persons to the accident; and the means by which the shock
is caused." 0 8 In British Gas, the first head of foreseeability is most significant.
100. 3 All E.R. 455 (C.A. 1987).
101. Attia v. British Gas plc, 3 All E.R. 455, 462 (C.A. 1987).

102. Id. at 456.
103.

Id. at 456.

104. Id. at 462.
105. Id. at 455, 456.
106. McLoughlin v. O'Brian, 2 All E.R. 298 (H.L. 1982).

107. Id. at 304 f-g.
108. Id.
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As regards the class of persons, the possible range is between the closest
of family ties, of parent and child, or husband and wife, and the ordinary
bystander. Existing law recognises the claims of the first; it denies that
of the second, either on the basis that such persons must be assumed to be
possessed of fortitude sufficient to enable them to endure the calamities

of modem life or that defendants cannot be expected to compensate the
world at large. 109
Without discussing whether British Gas was a recognized calamity of modem life, Lord Wilberforce may finally be cited as authority for a striking
image of method. In situations of the type under discussion, "the courts have
proceeded in the traditional manner of the common law from case to case,
on a basis of logical necessity."110 The expression "logical necessity" is in
rhetoric the figure of syllogismus, defined as "a form of speech whereby the
orator amplifies a matter of conjecture.

. .

offering a sign or token to the

reason of the hearer, from which his meaning may be gathered," and deserves brief comment.' To claim that reasoning by likeness, by metaphor
or simile, by translation from one image to another or from one affection or
experience to the next, is a procedure of logical necessity can only be understood as irony or dissimulation. It is no more possible to "deduce" a relation
between one context and another than it is feasible to claim any strict identity
between the legal reconstruction of different events occurring at different
times and affecting different parties. The "logical necessity" of analogy is
at most a subjective necessity imposed by custom and habit. While Roman
law long recognized the logical weakness of such arguments predicated upon
similarity, the common law returns continuously to an empiricism which
claims somewhat mystically that analogy is the "natural tendency of the
human and legal mind."112 The analogy then suggested by Lord Wilberforce
is that of the different situations in which parents can recover for psychiatric
harm caused by injury to their child. Lord Scarman added laconically, "I
foresee social and financial problems if damages for 'nervous shock' should
be made available to persons other than parents and children ...

.,,113 The

Australian case of Jaensch v. Coffey,"' which stipulated no specific kinship
tie but a "close, constructive and loving relation" between the parties probably hit upon a formulation that best describes the current law - the tie must
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 304 g-h.
Id. at302f-g.
PEAcHAM, supra note 81, at 179-80.

McLoughlin v. O'Brian, 2 All E.R. 298, 303 a-b (H.L. 1982).
Id. at 311 e.
(1984) 54 A.L.R. 417.
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be close and affectionate and, while it need not necessarily fall within the
proximity, it does require an
conventional classifications of lineal or familial
115
affection lodged between human partners.
With the well-canvassed exception of rescue cases and the unique
example of claims based upon fear of injury to a workmate, legal doctrine
has consistently maintained that proximity with regard to the class of persons
allowed to recover means a tie of blood or a recognized relationship. Such
a relationship has always meant a relationship between persons. Even taking
account of judicial paternalism or the doctrinal desire to keep legal judgment
separate from the sphere of domesticity, it is hard to see that it falls within
the "natural tendency of the human and legal mind" to perceive a house
either as, or as being like, a relative or analogous to a person. Nor does
precedent provide any examples of logical necessity leading from person to
property or from animate to inanimate. A person is not in ordinary speech,
art, or legal language "like a house." The only precedent offering any
support for the Court of Appeal decision is the somewhat obscure earlier
decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Owens v. Liverpool Corp." 6
In that case, the plaintiffs witnessed an accident involving a dead relative, an
inanimate person." 7 The dead relative's coffin was dislodged by an omnibus
operated by the defendants."' Close relatives of the deceased in obvious
proximity to the accident experienced shock as a result." 9 On the grounds
that it is the dignity or office of the dead to be in repose, the court found that
the disturbance to the coffin and the threat that it might at any moment slide
out of the damaged hearse and fall to the street was sufficient ground for
recovery." The court recognized that the threat of injury to the dead was
a marginal if not tenuous analogy to earlier situations, but suggested that
what was significant was the proximity or strength of affection between the
parties.'' Lord Justice MacKinnon went further to suggest consideration of
the moot case of damage caused by the death of a much loved pet dog.'
The "beloved" dog is the Englishman's best, most trusted, and most loyal
friend, and it is easy to imagine that the court might well have difficulties
distinguishing the family dog from other members of the family. It remains
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Jaensch v. Coffey (1984) 54 A.L.R. 417, 457.
See Owens v. Liverpool Corp., 4 All E.R. 727 (C.A. 1938).
Id. at 729 c-d.
Id. at729b.
Id. at729c-d.
Id. at 731 a.
Id. at 730 e to 731 a.
Id. at 730 f.
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the case, however, that the subjects of injury in precedent cases extended no
further than a hypothetical living non-person or a dead relative.
Returning to the decision in Attia, it is evident rhetorically that more is
at stake than a simple question of the foreseeable consequences of damage
to property. That case involves an immediate shift in the depiction of the
facts from the cognitive to the affective and from description to evaluation
when the object of damage is renamed and becomes not a house but a home.
The figure in question is that of antonomasia or change of name. It is
described by Smith as a sentential figure (figura sententiae), which "is a
figure... for the forcible moving of affections, doth after a sort beautify the
sense and very meaning of a sentence. "" Its rhetorical effect is depicted by
Peacham as that of metonymically transferring the value of some "dignity,
office, profession, science or trade" from its proper referent to a novel
comparata." In its usual rhetorical manipulation, the substitution of name
is metonymic in the sense of selecting a quality or essence that is representative of the whole: Cicero for eloquence, the Philosopher for Aristotle and so
on, where the substituted name elects to qualify the object or subject in either
a positive or negative fashion. The attribution is the more powerful for
being unmarked or tacit; its force and accuracy are simply assumed and the
lauded or denigrated part not only is taken for the whole but also moves
from passive to active, from description to qualification, and in sum from
object to telos or goal. Whether or not one term or another, house or home,
is more properly descriptive of the structure that formed the subject matter
of the decision, the shift or slippage from one term to the other, from species
to species or from the descriptive to the evaluative, gives occasion for analytic concern. The trope is an indicator of an affect or unconscious intent,
a figure of a subtle argumentative shift and it is precisely the hidden, oneiric
or repressed connotations of "home" that the analyst should pursue. One can
argue that these connotations are institutional and so are largely unconscious.
Certainly, the judgments did not address the legal status or meaning of a
home, nor did counsel appear to raise this issue in its argument. The institutional connotations of the shift from one noun to another have to be reconstructed in these circumstances both in terms of the particular judgment and
in the longer term context of the doctrinal text of which the decision in Attia
is but a minor incidence.
The Court of Appeal recognized that the claim broke new ground. Indeed, "[n]o analogous claim has ever... been upheld or even advanced." 125
123.

JOHN SMrrH, THEMYSTERIEOFRH-ETORIQUEUNVAIL'D

124.

P ACHAM,

7 (London, E. Cotes 1657).

supra note 81, at 22.

125. Attia v. British Gas pic, 3 All E.R. 455, 464 c-d (C.A. 1987).
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Nonetheless, the court managed to discover a duty of care and to deem it
possible that, as a matter of fact, it was foreseeable that the plaintiff would
suffer psychiatric harm. Lord Justice Bingham went so far as to list other
objects of affection that might, if destroyed, so unsettle the seemingly
restrained emotional world of their owner that the court should probably
allow recovery, namely a scholar's life's work of research or composition
and a householder's "cherished possessions" or heirlooms.' In the present
instance, the damage was not simply to the contents but to the structure and
place of the home itself. 7 In the absence of any manifest legal reason in
doctrine or in precedent for the extension of liability for psychiatric harm to
cover damage occasioned by injury to things, it is necessary to follow the
trope or textual symptom, the path of affect, and inquire into the legal
significance of the home. The conscious surface of the decision is here less
important than its unconscious connotations; what is proffered as immediate
justification is of less moment than the longer term, structural causes of
judgment.
Two important legal connotations associated with the home and traceable to the very dawn of the modem common law arise. First, both in case
law and in doctrinal writing, the Englishman's home is his castle. As early
as Semayne's Case in 1605, the court held that the home was a place of
sanctity, tranquillity, and peace." It was the safest of all refuges ("domus
sua cuique est tutissimum refugium"), 9 It was a place of some sanctity, a
hiding place, an escape, a castle, a fortress, and a space of repose and of
defense.1 30 In Institute of the Laws of England, Thomas Wood discusses
Semayne's Case and cites it as authority for the rule that, whereas an assembly or meeting of three of more is an offense, it is not punishable if it is "for
31
Safeguard of His House, and for the Defense of the possession thereof."
It is permissible to gather friends to prevent any unlawful entry into one's
own house, "but he cannot assemble his friends for the defense of his person
32
against those that threaten to beat him, while he is out of his house.'
Wood provides a variety of definitions of house (domus) and mansion house
(domus mansionalis). The fact that "a chamber in an Inn of Court, where
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 464 e-f.
Id. at 456 g.
Semayne's Case, in 5 COKE, supra note 47, at 91, 91.
Id.
Id.

131.

2 THOMAS WOOD, AN INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND

1720).
132. Id. at 736.

735 (Savoy, Sare
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one usually lodges, is a mansion-house" no doubt did much to aid the longevity of the legal profession.' 33
Later case law reiterates and emphasizes the sanctity of the home and
garden. The most famous statement of right comes in Entick v. CarringtonM
in which Lord Camden asserted the legal protection of the home to be an
"extraordinary jurisdiction" coeval with the law itself and so without origin
or evidence beyond its statement, save that "precedent supports it."' 35 The
Saxon concept of "house-peace" and the liberties spelled out in the Magna
Carta are likely sources of such precedent, though none is needed for so
ancient a rule. Lord Camden subsequently remarks upon the ethical legitimation of the rule as being coincident with the end or telos of law and of
society itself: "The great end, for which men entered society, was to secure
their property. That right is preserved sacred and incommunicable in all
instances, where it has not been taken away or abridged by some public law
for the good of the whole."' 36 With a measure of hyperbole suitable to the
occasion and the threat to this admittedly defeasible right, Lord Camden
concludes with the celebrated defense of the English home and garden,
stating that "[n]o man can set foot upon my ground without my licence, but
he is liable to an action, though the damage be nothing ... [even for no

more than] bruising the grass.., or treading upon the soil."' 37 Later cases
state a similar exaggeration of an impermanent right in terms of the protection of every single room in the house by separate writs of trespass. The
house, of course, was many things in legal terms and was certainly not free
of legal and ecclesiastical interference with regard, for example, to "good
government" or with respect to the proper forms of worship or the duties of
husband and wife. It was in an express sense a symbol, a condensation of
numerous narratives of English identity, an image to which the judges
attached a peculiar if unwitting legal force.
Whether or not the common law protection of the house as home of the
subject is viewed as successful or otherwise effective, the home is a legal
term that carries a remarkable significance. The home is autobiographically
both domesticity and family. It is the site of the originary law of paternity,
and also, in its earliest stages, the gynaeceum or maternal domain. The
home psychoanalytically connotes emotional security, nurture, and the
immemorial, that which is - like common law - a record or testament aere
133.

Id. at 652.

134. 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (1765).
135. Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029, 1066 (1765).
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perennius. The home represents tradition in the precise sense that the home
is external to and survives its occupation. It is the place of the forefathers,
the image as imago or mask of the ancestor, and all that in nuce to which we
belong. The instant that the Court in Attia v. British Gas plc138 turned from
house to home or simply categorized the injury as being occasioned not by
damage to property, but far more specifically indicated that the damage was
caused by the burning of the home, it returned unconsciously to a category
of legal tradition with an extraordinary though heavily veiled affective force.
The description - by the figure of prosographia- of the burning home as

the material cause of the harm suffered carries with it an unconscious sense
of an absolute violation: to destroy a sacred place is a sacrilege by ecclesiastical law. It is a transgression of the boundaries between species or profanation of the marks of an iconic space. In more secular terms, destruction of
the home is disrespectful of tradition and contemptuous of lineage, ancestral
virtue, and what lawyers term the "titles of antiquity" that families pass on
through the home. One can go further to suggest that destruction of the
home connotes a challenge to the most basic law, not simply that of kinship,
but in legal terms that of the first societas, the family and its order of succession.
The fact that the plaintiff was a woman is also significant. In Owens v.
Liverpool Corp.,39 the court questioned, "[i]f real injury has genuinely been
caused by shock from apprehension as to something less important than
human life (for example, the life of a beloved dog), can the sufferer recover
no damages for the injury he, or perhaps oftener she, has sustained?" 40 It
is not clear what weight this shift in gender would have in determining the
factual outcome of either case, but one should undoubtedly observe that in
affective terms the home is a gendered category. In constitutional doctrine,
Sir Thomas Smith, following Aristotle, finds that the household is the internal domain of the woman, while the external world is the sphere of men. 141
In terms of the ecclesiastical law of marriage contemporary with the earliest
surviving statements of the privacy and sanctity of the home, it is clear that
protection of the home is protection of the vulnerable, the women and
children, for whom the home is the world. In this respect the portrait of the
facts in Attia again betrays an unconscious reservoir of institutional emotions
138. Attia v. British Gas plc, 3 All E.R. 455 (C.A. 1987); supra notes 100-05, 124-26
and accompanying text (discussing Attia).

139. Owens v. Liverpool Corp., 4 All E.R. 727 (C.A. 1938); supra notes 116-122 and
accompanying text (discussing Owens).
140. Owens, 4 All E.R. at 730.
141. SI THOMAS SMiTH, DE REPUBLICA ANGLORUM 58-59 (Mary Dewar ed., 1982).
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or structures of value that persist over the longue durge of common law.
The figure of antonomasiaindicates a slip or unconscious motive and allows
for the reconstruction of "another scene" of legal judgment, that of affect and
desire. In terms, finally, of the structure of the legal unconscious, the case
of Attia is representative of one dimension of the conflict that constitutes the
dogma, dream order, or delirium of the institution. Psychoanalytic reconstruction of the case opens up a zone of affects and redefines the house as an
object amongst other objects of identification and love. The judges are
trained to deny the emotive basis of their reason. They nowhere discuss the
affective source of their decision. Yet, it is evident from the analysis of the
figures of the decision that, in this case, as in others, judgment follows an
affective course, the logic being one of a political desire or legal aesthetic.
It is striking and sad that one cannot address this logic within the terms of
law. The soul of the lawyer must remain an artifice that denies its affectivity
and remains estranged even from its own representations.
Conclusion
The aesthetic and affective dimensions of legal community are not
readily accessible primarily because legal training and the jurisprudential
self-representations of law direct practitioners to deny the affectivity, emotions, and imaginations that underlie the sober appearance, the order, hierarchy, and reason of legal rule. In one classical legal formulation, "nothing
is more beautiful than order."142 That order or legality was to be represented
in the form of logic or more geometrico because the beauty that law promulgated was one of abstract geometrical precision, of exact calculation and
repeated norms. Observers within the jurisprudential tradition have directed
little attention to the possibility that such a representation of law was itself
an image or more properly an icon, that it had its origins in the acquisitive
and military concerns of imperial Christian powers, that it feared other
images of power or community because they represented an unwarranted
freedom of thought. Law fears the image and the correlative logic of affections because the legal profession and the legal order require social recognition of a very specific and specialized icon ofjustice, the residue of a monotheistic source of law, a singular and hierarchically placed sovereign, a
unique social subject with which the legal subject can identify exclusively
and jealously.
Lawyers also fear images because the associative (or metonymic) logic
of images is unamenable to legal forms of control in the same sense that one
142.
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must listen, rather than speak, to the unconscious - and lawyers, at least in
their professional persona, are bad listeners. Law fears images because
images are the bearers of emotion and lay bare an affectivity of law that
jurisprudence historically has sought to repress or at least to train and to
restrain in the particular image of an abstract and disembodied logic of
law.143 One must acknowledge that the singular image or icon of modem
law, that of a science of abstract rules and of their disembodied manipulation, lacks aesthetic force and represents a false self, an artifice that has for
some time seemed archaic and of decreasing relevance to the technologies
and virtual presences of the postmodern world. For all that, the lawyer is
peculiarly ill-equipped, by training and by habit, to develop new forms of
self-representation or to expand and diversify her understanding of the
images and emotions that underpin the practice of law. The malady of the
legal soul is precisely a malady of representation, an inculcated inability to
relate legal discourse to the psyche or to its affects and drives. It is an
estrangement from law's own intellectual life, from the eros within.' 44
Psychoanalytic method, and particularly the analytic concern with the
unconscious logic of the image, requires that law in both its plastic and
textual forms be thought or analyzed in very different ways. The psychoanalytic hermeneutics outlined above has suggested one avenue of pursuit of the
other scene or "other dimensions" of law through the figures, the images,
and other signs in the language of judgment. Such a hermeneutics is invaluable in that the textual tradition forms the almost exclusive focus of legal
doctrine. It is arguable, however, that even the text is just another image,
an icon of reason and rational governance, that should be subject as well to
the analysis of the lawyer's subjective attachments and professional affections.
Lawyers love texts and are classically portrayed as addicts of a sedentary and scriptural life. No day can pass without its texts.14 No legal life
can progress without a steadily accumulating library and the passion of
literary study. 1" The Renaissance lawyer Fulbecke speaks amusingly in this
143. For an overview of legal antipathy toward images, see generally Costas Douzinas,
Whistler v. Ruskin: Law's FearofImages, 19 ART HIsT. 353 (1996); GOODRICH, supra note
9, at 68-107.
144. See JULiAKRiSvA, NEW MALADIES OF THE SOUL 3-44 (1995) (discussing maladies
of the soul in psychoanalytic terms).
145. NORTH, supra note 95, at 7 ("nulla die sine linea").
146. There is in this respect the story of the Renaissance French lawyer Guillaume Bud6
who is reported to have loved his books, literarum studium, more than his wife or his
children, and who is commended for this philological passion by another lawyer, Jan-Luis
Vives. See GOODRICH, supra note 36, at 138-41.
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context of the scourge of lawyers, men so transformed and consumed by law
that they
are so full of law points, that when they sweat it is nothing but law, when
they breath it is nothing but law, when they sneeze it is perfect law, when
they dream it is profound law. The book of Littleton's Tenures is their
breakfast, their dinner, their boier [tea], their supper and their rare
banquest. 147
Love of texts in this respect is a symptom, however, not of a strictly normative content, but of an image of temporal distance and an aura of mystical
authority. To the legal mind, the text harbors a paternal authority that
pre-exists and is for that reason impervious to the contemporary techniques
of historical, literary, and psychoanalytic criticism. The text is an emblem
of attachment. It represents an order and hierarchy of meaning, tradition,
and continuity that structures and supports the established community of law
and its image of professional integrity. The lawyer's love of the text is
classically a filial love, that of the attachment of a child to a parent. It is one
of faith, fear, and respect, but one that can also mask a murderous desire."'
In either event, it is a passion that is greatly threatened, as is the textual
order of legal meaning, by the psychoanalytic assertion of the Oedipal
character of this love, of the phantasmic quality of its interpretative practices
and other forms of dissemination.
The text allows the lawyer to say "it is written" and so evade accountability for the rule or judgment made. In writing a judgment that somewhat
counter-intuitively and illogically denied the relevance of the homosexuality
of the couple who were held to have been in breach of the peace for kissing
in public, the court in Masterson v. Holden'49 pretended to a simple or
unwitting application of precedent rules. The judge, in other words, refused
to address the substance of the offence or the specific subject who had acted
offensively. Justice, at least in the sense of hearing or simply seeing the
other who comes to be judged, was not done. Law was applied merely
calculatively and not casuistically. In that sense, modem law is an unthinking exercise of power, a simple circulation of texts rather than an exercise
of art or judgment. In Freud's argument, this disembodiment of the source
147. 2 WILLIAM
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of power or author of law was necessary to the process of identification
through which law becomes an object of attachment. For law to be an object
of communal love, courts must represent it as a mythic or totemic object
with which the subject can identify. Such identification is erotic, "binding
the members of the community together in a libidinal way." 1 o Eros, in other
words, is at the basis of law because it is a collective love in the form of a
shared identification with the icons of legality, with the images of the sovereign author of law, whether Parliament, President, or people, nation, necessity, or nature, that binds the group and limits the individual's pursuit of
power. Christianity and law inherit the maxim that we love our neighbor
from a basic psychological principle which Freud interprets in terms of the
necessity of loving ourselves in others. In the absence of such love or of the
civilizing force of Eros, man would simply be a predator upon other men.
Homo homini lupus"
An obvious point remains. If desire underpins legal order and if its
surface reason masks a thinly veiled sexual love, to date a homosexual love,
it has been a competition pursued between male rivals. Freud treated this
issue not only in terms of the Oedipus complex, but also in terms of his
theory of infantile sexual development. In that theory, he admitted that
social feeling is closely connected to homosexual love: the rival - the father
or the brother - is transformed, by identification, into a love-object. 5 According to the Freudian theory of the subject (ego), the social relation
with the other is a relation to oneself. It is simultaneously social and narcissistic. Hence, it is a homosexual love, an amorous fixation between similars
which first integrates the rivalry of brothers or the social tensions imposed
by instinct."' Whatever the wider theory of normalization that this thesis
implies, in legal terms it supports the characterization of the professional
community as being homosexually bonded. The competitiveness, rivalry,
and professional competition that mark the lawyer as a successful member
of the legal community are predicated more upon the similarities of the
group members than upon their differences. Intrinsic to the professional
community is a group identification by means of which rivals identify
150. FREUD, supra note 3, at 55.
151. Man is a wolf to man. FREUD, supra note 3, at 58 (citing Plautus, AsinariaII, iv,
88); see J.C. SMITH, THE NEUROTIC FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL ORDER: PSYCHOANALYTIC
ROOTS OF PATRIARCHY 348-55 (1990) (discussing this theme).
152. 18 SIGMUND FREUD, Some Neurotic Mechanisms in Jealousy, Paranoia and
Homosexuality, in THE STANDARD EDITION, supra note 12, at 221, 231-32; see BORCHJACOBSEN, supra note 39, at 200-04 (discussing this Freudian theory).
153. See generally tCTs, supra note 9, at ch. 6; MKKEL BORCH-JACOBSEN, LACAN:
TiH ABSOLUTE MASTER 21-41 (1991) (discussing Lacanian theory).
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themselves with one another through a similar love of the same object. As
the example of Mastersonsuggested, the latent homosexuality of the profession itself renders recognition of the erotic substrate of social interaction so
immediately threatening and so rapidly in need of official denial. 54
Freud and those who follow him depict a law that is modeled upon the
power of the father. They elaborate a symbolic order that is patriarchal in
its norms and in its methods. To some extent that account of the legal order
reflects an institution embedded in a history of homosocial power and a
continuing male privilege. It would be wrong, however, to leave the psychoanalytic interpretation of law without also acknowledging its subversive
potential. As a hermeneutic or technique of textual interpretation, psychoanalysis provides a radical method for exploring the repressed affectivity and
so also the potential of lawyering. The analysis of textual traces and rhetorical figures allows for the reconstruction of an affectivity of judgment that
lawyers have seldom paused to admit or analyze. The erotic basis of legal
order, its foundation in desire, is open to other readings. The subject's
attachment to law is also an unconscious fascination or bonding, a matter of
phantasms and images of power and community. To understand that other
dimension of law is to facilitate a critical apprehension of the symbolic
nature of the power of legal community and to foster the possibility of its
revision according to other dictates and other desires. "The history of
dreams, if it were to be written, would also be a history of law." 55 The
interpretation of the relation of laws to dreams can help the critic understand
the soul of the lawyer and so also the affectivities of law and of legal judgment. It can thus further play a role in freeing the subject of law from the
initial and initiatory erasure of individual subjectivity, of experience and
affection, the deletion of the "I" with which the trauma of entry into law
begins.

154. See supra notes 69-78 (discussing Masterson).
155. Vismann, supra note 52, at 134.

